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 Institutionalizing Press Relations at the 




At the U.S. Supreme Court, the press is the primary link between the jus-
tices and the public, and the Public Information Office (“PIO”) is the prima-
ry link between the justices and the press.  This Article explores the story of 
the PIO’s origins, providing the most complete account to date of its early 
history.  That story is anchored by the major events of several eras – from the 
Great Depression policymaking of the 1930s to the social and political up-
heaval of the 1970s.  It is also defined by the three men who built and shaped 
the office in the course of forty years. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Anna Nicole Smith drew a big crowd in 2006 when she arrived at the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  The former Playboy model and reality-TV star was 
there to watch the oral argument in her own case, an effort to claim part of 
her late husband’s estate.1  Photographers swarmed her, one bystander shout-
ed that she was a “goddess,” and the public line to attend the argument 
wrapped around the Court’s plaza.2  As the writer and scholar Jonathan 
Turley noted, Smith’s appearance generated more attention and news “cover-
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 1. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Hears Anna Nicole Smith’s Case, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 28, 2006, 10:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-
02-28-anna-nicole_x.htm. 
 2. See Patty Reinert, Anna Nicole Smith Draws a Crowd, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 
28, 2006), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/3690584.html. 
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age than it would if Chief Justice John Marshall returned from the dead for 
the argument.”3 
Once in the courtroom, however, where cameras are not allowed, Smith 
quickly blended in, “just one more face, barely perceptible amid about 300 
visitors.”4  Indeed, it appeared that few in the “gallery even knew she was 
there, sitting halfway back in the public section, quietly wiping away tears” 
as Justice Stephen Breyer talked about Smith’s late husband, the billionaire 
oilman who married Smith when she was twenty-six and he was eighty-nine.5  
At the end of the argument, Smith slipped out the Court’s side door, then 
negotiated through a throng of photographers.6  She made no statements and 
signed no autographs.7  She just smiled a few times before sliding into a dark 
sport-utility vehicle parked on the street.8 
Slate writer Dahlia Lithwick wrote at the time: “I would love to tell you 
that [Smith] did something, anything, to distinguish herself from the thou-
sands of appellants who have brought their cases into these marble walls.  But 
the court has worked its magical spell of blandness, . . . and she is just anoth-
er litigant with a probate dispute today.”9  And yet she did distinguish herself 
if only because her presence created a media frenzy.  News outlets from 
around the country staked out the Court to get photos of her arriving and 
leaving.10  Others requested extra seats in the courtroom, and still others, 
many covering the place for the first time, asked Court officials for help and 
guidance.11  They did not know where to begin. 
At the center of the media frenzy was the Public Information Office 
(“PIO”), the institutional liaison between the Court and the public and news 
media.  Its staff credentialed reporters to attend the argument, fielded requests 
from broadcasters to shoot video around the plaza, and answered questions 
about the Court’s traditions and procedures.12  However, the staff did not hold 
 
 3. Jonathan Turley, Lap Dances, Wills and – You, USA TODAY (Feb. 27, 2006, 
8:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-02-27-anna-nicole
-edit_x.htm. 
 4. Biskupic, supra note 1. 
 5. Reinert, supra note 2. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Biskupic, supra note 1; Peter Lattman, Update: Anna Nicole and the Su-
premes, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2006, 1:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/02/28/
anna-nicole-and-the-supremes-update/. 
 9. Dahlia Lithwick, Rack and Ruin: The Supreme Court Considers Anna Ni-
cole’s Surprisingly Real Claims, SLATE (Feb. 28, 2006, 6:16 PM), http://www.slate
.com/id/2137106/. 
 10. Interview with Kathleen Arberg, Public Information Officer, U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Wash. D.C. (May 17, 2011). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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a press conference about the case, did not distribute news releases, and did 
not offer any analysis or interpretation of the briefs or oral argument.13 
The day after Smith’s oral argument, the PIO intern, a college student, 
asked one of his coworkers about the origins of the office.14  He wanted to 
know where it came from and how it operated in the early days.  The cowork-
er did not have concrete answers.  Nor did others in the office.  The general 
consensus was that in the 1930s an Associated Press reporter misinterpreted 
the reasoning of the Gold Clause Cases and issued a bulletin misstating the 
Court’s decision, an error that facilitated the hiring of a press liaison and the 
creation of the Public Information Office. 
In reality, the story of the PIO’s origins is more complicated, and this 
Article is the first to explore that story in depth, providing the most complete 
account to date of the PIO’s early history.  It is worthy of exploration because 
the interaction among elites, institutions, and the public is of primary im-
portance in a democratic society.15  At the Supreme Court, specifically, the 
press is the primary link between the justices and the public, and the PIO is 
the primary link between the justices and the press.  To explore the PIO’s 
early history, then, is to explore how the Court has attempted to influence the 
flow of information between elites and the public. 
Studies of the Supreme Court and press activities, which have focused 
mostly on news coverage of the Court, have crossed methodological lines, 
including historical methods and interviews,16 case studies,17 observation,18 
quantitative methods,19 and content analysis.20  This Article uses historical 
methods and interviews.  First, it relies on primary sources: correspondence 
of the justices, memoranda among the justices and other Court officers, inter-
nal Court newsletters and bulletins, Court press releases and media adviso-
ries, and speeches.  These were available through reporters who cover the 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. The PIO intern referred to is the author, Jonathan Peters. 
 15. ELIOT E. SLOTNICK & JENNIFER SEGAL, TELEVISION NEWS AND THE SUPREME 
COURT: ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO AIR? 1 (1998). 
 16. See, e.g., RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT AND THE MEDIA AGE (2011); RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS (1993) [hereinafter DECISIONS AND IMAGES]. 
 17. See, e.g., DAVID GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA (1968); 
Richard Davis, Lifting the Shroud: News Media Portrayal of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
9 COMM. & L. 43 (1987). 
 18. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 17. 
 19. See, e.g., LARRY BERKSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS PUBLICS: THE 
COMMUNICATION OF POLICY DECISIONS (1978); JOHN GATES, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT: A MACRO- AND MICROLEVEL PERSPECTIVE (1992); 
THOMAS MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); DAVID 
ROHDE & HAROLD SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976). 
 20. See, e.g., David Ericson, Newspaper Coverage of the Supreme Court, 54 
JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 605 (1977); Ethan Katsh, The Supreme Court Beat: How 
Television Covers the U.S. Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 6 (1983); Michael Soli-
mine, Newsmagazine Coverage of the Supreme Court, 57 JOURNALISM Q. 661 (1980). 
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Court and through (1) the Thurgood Marshall papers, housed at the Library of 
Congress, and (2) the Lewis F. Powell papers, housed at Washington and Lee 
University.  Second, this Article relies on secondary sources: books, articles, 
treatises, monographs, and videos commenting on the Court’s relationship 
with the press.  Third, it relies on interviews with six current or former mem-
bers of the Supreme Court press corps and three current or former Court 
staffers.  The average interview lasted ninety minutes, and all but one were 
conducted in person. 
II.  THE EARLY DAYS 
In the 1930s, the Supreme Court found itself in the middle of Great De-
pression policymaking.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt was lobbying Con-
gress to pass a series of bills, collectively called the New Deal, to improve 
economic conditions across the country.21  The bills focused on what histori-
ans today call the Three R’s: relief for the unemployed; recovery of the econ-
omy; and reform of the financial system.22  Although many of the bills 
passed, with Roosevelt signing them into law, the Supreme Court found sev-
eral of them unconstitutional. 
Consider the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.23  Supported by 
Roosevelt, who believed prosperous farms would lead to a prosperous Amer-
ica, the Act created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (“AAA”).24  
Its purpose was to raise the price of commodities through subsidies and scar-
city.25  However, the AAA met an early demise when the Supreme Court 
ruled in 1936 that the Agricultural Adjustment Act was unconstitutional.26  
Justice Owen J. Roberts, writing for the majority, said a “statutory plan to 
regulate and control agricultural production [is] a matter beyond the powers 
delegated to the federal government.”27  Just one year earlier, the Court had 
struck down Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which created 
the National Recovery Administration, responsible in general for stabilizing 
wages and prices.28 
Frustrated and determined to get around the Supreme Court, Roosevelt 
used the Senate Majority Leader to propose and push for the Judicial Proce-
 
 21. JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT: FDR’S HUNDRED DAYS AND THE 
TRIUMPH OF HOPE 163 (2006). 
 22. Rita G. Koman, Relief, Recovery, Reform: The New Deal Congressional 
Reaction to the Great Depression, OAH MAG. OF HIST., Summer 1998, at 39. 
 23. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31. 
 24. Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/9551/Agricultural-Adjustment-
Administration-AAA (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 25. Id. 
 26. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 27. Id. at 68. 
 28. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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dures Reform Bill of 1937, often called the court-packing plan.29  Among 
other things, it would have granted the president the authority to appoint up to 
six additional justices to the Court, one new member for every sitting justice 
older than 70.5 years.30  Roosevelt thought that by expanding the size of the 
Court he could create a pro-New Deal majority.31  Although the plan failed, 
the Court’s independence and image had been threatened, compelling the 
justices to fight back publicly.32  Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, for 
example, wrote a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee that challenged the 
president’s rationale for the court-packing plan.33  Newspapers republished 
the letter.34 
Amid that political drama,35 the Supreme Court quietly appointed a 
member of the clerk’s staff to “handle queries from hundreds of news writers 
seeking information on court moves that have captured public attention, espe-
cially since the New Deal controversies began pouring into the tribunal.”36  
The idea came from a committee of reporters that pitched the idea to Hughes, 
and the job ultimately fell to Ned Potter, who had worked in the clerk’s office 
for eight years recording the Court’s formal minutes.37  Potter had no experi-
ence in journalism or public relations, and that may have been the point.38  
Court officials emphasized at the time that Potter was not a “press agent” or 
“public relations counselor.”39  He would issue no “handouts” or “press re-
leases.”40  He would not comment on the Court’s opinions and orders, nor 
 
 29. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, THE HUGHES COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND 
LEGACY 24 (2002). 
 30. FDR’s Losing Battle to Pack the Supreme Court, N. COUNTRY PUB. RADIO 
(April 13, 2010), http://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/npr/125789097/fdr-s-
losing-battle-to-pack-the-supreme-court. 
 31. Id. 
 32. DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 16, at 32. 
 33. Richard D. Friedman, Chief Justice Hughes’ Letter on Court-Packing, J. SUP. 
CT. HIST., no. 1, at 79-83 (1997). 
 34. Id. at 83. 
 35. In 1935, an Associated Press reporter misinterpreted the majority opinion in 
the Gold Clause cases and sent out a bulletin misstating the Court’s decision.  See 
Everette E. Dennis, Another Look at Press Coverage of the Supreme Court, 20 VILL. 
L. REV. 765, 770 (1975).  That error led to a policy change at the Court that allowed 
reporters to get opinion proofs as soon as the opinions were announced in the court-
room.  Id.  It is also possible that for Court officials the error illustrated the need for a 
press liaison.  Id. 
 36. Associated Press, Supreme Court Gets a ‘Press Contact Man’; Appointment 
Was Requested by Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1936, at 2. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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would he explain them.41  Rather, Potter would maintain a complete set of 
briefs, opinions, and other records for the convenience of the press, he would 
credential reporters for seating in the courtroom, and he would supervise the 
press room.42 
Although this marked a significant step for the Court, appointing “an of-
ficial for the mutual benefit of the press and the [C]ourt officers,” it did not 
merit an official announcement.43  No press release, no media advisory, no 
memo.  Nothing.  In fact, “[t]he appointment became known when Mr. Potter 
moved his desk and files into the larger of the two rooms assigned to the 
press in the basement of the [new] . . .  building.”44  Those rooms, the Court’s 
first attempt to institutionalize its relationship with the press, were “remarka-
bly good” for a place “long distinguished [by] its detached attitude.”45  The 
press rooms even included pneumatic tubes that linked them with the court-
room, enabling the reporters upstairs to “send copy swiftly down to telegraph 
and telephone instruments below.”46  Still, compared with other institutions, 
the Court was slow to provide physical space to the press and to appoint a 
press liaison.47  When the Court moved into its current building and opened 
the press room, Congress and the White House years before had allocated 
space for the press.48  Likewise, when the Court appointed Potter to be the 
press liaison, Congress and the White House years before had hired their own 
press officers.49 
For the first few years, Potter basically shuffled paper and made sure the 
reporters had what they needed to do their jobs.50  But by the late 1930s, early 
1940s, Potter and the Court began to accommodate the press “in ways both 
large and small.”51  One example involved the selection of cases for oral ar-
gument.52  Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Court’s jurisdiction had been 
primarily discretionary, which meant the justices could choose what cases 
they heard.53  Before the justices met to discuss the petitions, in a meeting 
called the conference, the chief justice prepared a list of cases that in his view 
should be considered.  Historically, the Court did not distribute that list to 
 
 41. Lewis Wood, Press Needs Met by Supreme Court: New Contact Officer To 
Make Work Easier for Reporters Assigned to Cover Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1936, 
at E7. 
 42. Associated Press, supra note 36. 
 43. Wood, supra note 41. 
 44. Associated Press, supra note 36. 
 45. Wood, supra note 41. 
 46. Id. 
 47. DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 16, at 35. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 36. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 49. 
 53. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 850 
(1989). 
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reporters, but sometime during Potter’s tenure the Court began to do so.54  
The distribution of the list enabled the reporters to preview cases and even to 
write about ones that did not get a hearing.55 
In 1947, Banning Whittington, who covered the Court for United Press 
from 1941-1945, replaced Potter.56  He carried on the largely clerical and 
administrative tasks of maintaining briefs and opinions for the press, creden-
tialing reporters, and supervising the physical space.57  But he also took on 
the role, in his twenty-six-year tenure, of press counselor to the justices and 
advocate for the press corps.58  First, to keep the justices informed of news 
coverage of the Court, Whittington sent memos to chambers that included 
newspaper and magazine clippings.59  He also maintained a list of reporters 
covering the institution and notified the justices when someone joined the 
beat.60  Second, Whittington produced an in-house newsletter, the Docket 
Sheet, which was distributed to all Court employees, including the justices.61  
It featured all manner of personnel news and shoptalk, such as birth and death 
announcements and retirement stories.62  Third, in 1967, after Chief Justice 
Earl Warren gave a speech about crime control, Whittington conferred with 
Warren about the lack of news coverage of the speech, discussing with War-
ren the reasons the speech failed to generate much news.63  Whittington did 
the same for other justices, too, conferring with them about the news cover-
age of their extrajudicial activities.64 
Meanwhile, as an advocate for the press corps, Whittington recom-
mended changes to Court practices to accommodate press needs.65  One such 
practice was the release of opinions at the end of the term.66  Historically, the 
 
 54. DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 16, at 36. 
 55. Id. at 49. 
 56. Id. at 38. 
 57. Id. at 56. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Arthur John Keeffe, Practicing Lawyers’ Guide to the Current Law 
Magazines, 52 A. B. A. J. 1168, 1168 (1966). 
 62. DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 16, at 50. 
 63. DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 16, at 57. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  This is not to say Whittington always supported the press or always sup-
ported practices designed to improve news coverage of the Court.  For example, at 
one time law professors were available in the press room to answer questions and to 
help reporters understand the legal issues raised by opinions.  Lionel S. Sobel, News 
Coverage of the Supreme Court, 56 A.B.A.J. 547, 550 (1970).  They were there, in 
the fall of 1964, because of an Association of American Law Schools project.  Id.  It 
was abandoned, however, just one year later.  Id.  Reporters often were too rushed to 
consult the on-duty professor, and many people at the Court, including Warren and 
Whittington, did not like the project.  Id.  Of course, whether that program actually 
helped the press is a separate question. 
 66. DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 16, at 36. 
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Court released opinions only on Mondays, and the controversial ones tended 
to stack up as the term progressed.67  As a result, the justices often released a 
dozen opinions, totaling hundreds and hundreds of pages, on a single day in 
June.68  That frustrated reporters, who found it difficult to wade through the 
opinions and to report on them accurately, all with a deadline looming.  In 
1965, after a lobbying campaign by reporters and others, including Whitting-
ton, the Court changed its practice of releasing opinions only on Mondays.69 
One year later, the Court reversed its practice of not announcing which 
decision days would see opinions.70  Just because it was a decision day did 
not mean a decision would be released that day.71  This made it difficult for 
reporters to plan ahead to be at the Court, so they complained to Chief Justice 
Warren, who authorized Whittington to “notify reporters in advance of days 
when decisions would be announced.”72  Then, in 1969, amid an effort to 
deny reporters access to the conference list, Whittington supported the press 
corps.73  He wrote to Warren that “it would be a very big handicap for all of 
them to work without [the list].”74  Whittington and the reporters prevailed.75 
Around the same time, Whittington was lobbying Warren to release 
headnotes (i.e., summaries of the ruling and reasoning) with the body of eve-
ry opinion.76  Some justices already were doing so, but most were not.77  
Clerks simply prepared the headnotes when the opinions were on their way to 
the United States Reports, well after they had been released.78  That changed 
when NBC News reporter Carl Stern raised the issue with Chief Justice War-
ren Burger, in the late 1960s, early 1970s: 
I told Burger the sad story of how I reported a case wrong on a day 
when the justices dumped a dozen opinions on us . . . I told him it 
would be wonderful if the Court would release headnotes at the same 
time they released opinions.  Then I wouldn’t face some kind of trau-
ma every time the Court released multiple opinions.  Burger agreed . . 
. and instructed the Reporter of Decisions to do it.79 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 37. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 60. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 38. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Interview with Carl Stern, Former Reporter, NBC News, in Wash. D.C. 
(May 15, 2011). 
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Whittington also worked with Burger to enlarge the press section of the 
courtroom.  For many years, the reporters sat at tables directly in front of the 
justices, but that arrangement accommodated only half a dozen reporters.80  
Moving the press section to the left side of the room quadrupled that number 
and allowed the Court to seat reporters in an overflow area behind the sec-
tion.81  This was a needed change because the number of legal reporters was 
on the rise.82  Not everyone, however, liked the move.  “One of the effects . . . 
was that reporters could no longer eavesdrop on the justice’s [sic] whispers to 
each other while sitting on the bench.  Some . . . complained that due to the 
poor acoustics . . . they could not even hear the justices or counsel from the 
new press section.”83 
Finally, in the most noted story involving Whittington, he was neither a 
press counselor to the justices nor an advocate for the press corps.  Instead, he 
was a minor player in a major event: the release of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.84  Reporters first heard that May 17, 1954, would be a “quiet day.”85  
They were working in the press room as the justices conducted business up-
stairs, releasing opinions on monopolistic practices in milk sales, on collect-
ing indemnity from negligent employees, and on the rights of union workers 
to picket retail stores.86  It looked like a quiet day, indeed. 
But before the Court adjourned, clerk Harold Willey dispatched a 
pneumatic message to Whittington, who slipped on his coat in the press room 
and announced to the reporters, “Reading of the segregation decisions is 
about to begin in the courtroom.  You will get the opinions up there.”87  At 
first he moved so nonchalantly that Louis Lautier, of the Negro Newspaper 
Publishers Association, later said, “I thought [Whittington] was going to say 
he was going to lunch.”88  He picked up speed, though, once he got in the 
hallway.89  The courtroom was “one floor up, reached [only] by a long flight 
of marble steps.”90  Whittington ran with the reporters down the hall, up the 
steps and around the corner, and they arrived just in time to hear Warren 
begin reading.91 
 
 80. DECISIONS AND IMAGES, supra note 16, at 37.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 85. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 701-02 (1977). 
 86. Id. at 702. 
 87. Id.; Luther A. Huston, High Court Bans School Segregation; 9-to-0 Decision 
Grants Time to Comply, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0517.html#article. 
 88. Lerone Bennett, Jr., The Day Race Relations Changed Forever, EBONY, May 
1985, at 108, 112. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Huston, supra note 87. 
 91. Id. 
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“I have for announcement,” Chief Justice Warren said, “the judgment 
and opinion of the Court in No. 1 – Oliver Brown et al. v. Board of Education 
of Topeka.”92  It was 12:52 p.m.93  Downstairs, the Associated Press “carried 
the first word to the country: ‘Chief Justice Warren today began reading the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the public school segregation cases.  The court’s 
ruling could not be determined immediately.’  The bells went off in every 
news room in America.  The nation was listening.”94  Shortly after Warren 
announced in full the Court’s ruling and summarized the reasoning, Whitting-
ton gathered and distributed copies of the opinion to reporters, before return-
ing to his office and essentially getting out of the reporters’ ways.95  Con-
sistent with Potter’s job description, Whittington did not interpret or other-
wise comment on the opinion.96 
III.  THE MODERN ERA 
By the early 1970s, America was at war abroad and with itself.  Fighting 
raged in Vietnam,97 the Pentagon Papers ignited a debate about the balance 
between national security and free speech,98 reporters Bob Woodward and 
Carl Bernstein began unraveling the lies of President Richard Nixon,99 and 
abortion restrictions divided the country, carving out new socio-religious 
fault lines.100  These and many other issues reached the Supreme Court, 
where Warren Burger had been chief justice since 1969.101  An energetic and 
physically imposing man, he presided over a Court that was, in its own way, 
as activist as Earl Warren’s, “creating new constitutional doctrine in areas 
like the right to privacy, due process and sexual equality.”102 
Chief Justice Burger did all he could to preserve the secrecy of the 
Court’s internal operations, and quite frequently he was hostile to the press.  
Asked by a lawyer at a symposium what he thought of the reporters covering 
the Court, Burger replied, as he often did: “I admire those who do a good job, 
 
 92. KLUGER, supra note 85, at 702. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. E-mail from Anthony Lewis, former columnist, N.Y. Times, to author (May 
15, 2011) (on file with author). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Vietnam War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica
.com/EBchecked/topic/628478/Vietnam-War (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 98. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 99. See generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S 
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and I have sympathy for the rest, who are in the majority.”103  In 1970, a 
Washington publisher chided Burger for requiring permission before his 
“State of the Judiciary” speech could be printed.104  And Burger reserved 
special scorn for TV, which he regarded as intrusive.105  He said in 1979 that 
his constitutional right to privacy allowed him to ban broadcast equipment 
from his public appearances,106 and one time he pushed away a TV camera-
man trying to follow him into an elevator.107 
Perhaps ironically, Burger was a former newspaper freelancer and wrote 
several of the Court’s most important opinions interpreting the First Amend-
ment and its free-expression guarantees.108  He also held regular meetings 
with the press, called “wages-and-hours sessions,” where Burger talked with 
reporters in the permanent press corps about working conditions and press 
policies at the Court.109  Those sessions were informal and generally off-the-
record.110  At one of them, when the Court was renovating a number of 
rooms, a reporter asked the chief, “Would you like for us to pay rent?”  Burg-
er paused before responding, “No, because renters have rights.”111  Joking or 
not, Lyle Denniston, who has covered the Court for more than sixty years, 
said, “I think that was reflective of his basic attitude.”112 
In any case, Burger’s “imprint was distinct in the area to which he gave 
his most sustained attention, judicial administration.”113  He created a number 
of offices and institutions whose common purpose was to “improve the edu-
cation and training of participants in nearly all phases of the judicial process,” 
because he believed “judges could be helped to be more efficient if profes-
sional management techniques were imported to the courts.”114  At the Su-
preme Court, one of the areas that got Burger’s attention was press and public 
affairs.  Whittington retired in 1973, and rather than simply appoint someone 
to replace him, Burger created a whole new office: the Public Information 
Office (“PIO”), led by a Public Information Officer.115 
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For the new position, Burger wanted a reporter who understood the 
news world – and not one trained in the law.116  A lawyer might be tempted to 
comment on Court opinions, and those comments might be taken as control-
ling law.  Additionally, Burger wanted someone who had worked at least five 
years as a government spokesperson, “someone who understood what State 
Department Spokesman Bob McCloskey once said: ‘Reporters and spokes-
men have the same task, to explain what the government is trying to do.  The 
spokesman has an additional job, to help the government succeed.’”117 
Barrett McGurn got that job, beating out 140 other applicants to become 
the Court’s first Public Information Officer.118  He had three decades of jour-
nalism experience – as an Army reporter for Yank magazine and as former 
chief of the Rome and Paris bureaus for the New York Herald Tribune.119  
After leaving journalism, McGurn was press attaché at the U.S. Embassy in 
Rome, from 1966 to 1968; embassy counselor for press affairs in Saigon, 
from 1968 to 1969; and deputy spokesman for the Department of State, from 
1969 to 1972.120  And right before he joined the Court’s staff, for a short time 
in 1972, he wrote commentaries for the world file of the U.S. Information 
Agency.121 
McGurn, a “formal man with an impish smile and eyebrows that had a 
life of their own,” conceived of the PIO, the physical space unchanged from 
the Whittington era, as a place where reporters could get documentary mate-
rials and courtroom seating but not much else.122  A former assistant to 
McGurn, who no longer works at the Court, described McGurn as “stoic” and 
“reserved” and “taciturn,” adding that he was a “loyalist to Chief Justice 
Burger” who “thought his was a position of preserving decorum for the Court 
and protecting it.”123  McGurn himself once said that “the job of a reporter 
covering the Supreme Court is a challenging and difficult one, calling upon 
the full range of each reporter’s talent and industry.  I think that the regulars 
who cover the Court understand that certain aids and some bits of information 
cannot be provided, given the Court’s special needs of its own.”124  McGurn 
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likely overestimated the understanding of the regulars – or perhaps underes-
timated their disdain for him. 
“He was useless and contemptuous of the press corps,” said Stephen 
Wermiel, who covered the Court for the Wall Street Journal.125  “He thought 
the beat was all about handing out the opinions and providing the orders 
list.”126  Others in the press corps felt the same way.  Denniston said, “You’d 
have to break Barrett’s arm to get him to do anything, because he didn’t care 
about the press.”127  Tony Mauro, of the National Law Journal, said, “His 
office wasn’t helpful at all. . . .  He was really tough to work with.”128  And 
Dick Carrelli, formerly of the Associated Press, described McGurn as “the 
palace guard.”129 
Often, it seemed McGurn was there to preserve secrecy and to insulate 
the justices, rather than help the press.130  First, when a reporter would re-
quest an interview with a justice, McGurn often did not send the request to 
the justice.131  Other times, when he would send the request, he would attach 
a memo to it that presumed the justice would not do the interview.132  Many 
of the memos reviewed for this article included the question, “Shall I tell the 
reporter you decline?”  McGurn might have adopted that approach because of 
the individual press practices of the justices (some generally did not do inter-
views), but in any case the presumption made it easy for the justices to de-
cline.  Wermiel summed up the problem this way: “His memos were designed 
to fend off reporters, in this sense: ‘I have some obligation to tell you that a 
reporter has asked a question, but that’s all you need to know; you don’t need 
to worry about it.’”133 
Second, when a reporter asked McGurn for information related to the 
Court, he rarely provided the information despite his “PIO theory” that “there 
was no such thing as an indiscreet question, only indiscreet answers.”134  The 
columnist Jack Anderson wrote in 1978 that “McGurn is a faithful reflection 
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of his master’s view that the press should be given only what Burger wants 
them to have, not what they ask for.”135  He went on to explain the way 
McGurn deflected questions he did not want to answer: 
[It] is a form of Nixonian stonewall: instead of refusing comment, he 
answers a different question, as if he hadn’t understood the real one.  
One reporter, thinking McGurn might not have heard him correctly, 
kept repeating his question.  The press officer, like the telephone-
answering tape recording, just kept repeating his irrelevant, unrespon-
sive reply.  As another victim of McGurn’s non sequiturs put it: “Your 
first impression is that they’re putting you on.  Your second impres-
sion is that they’re insulting your intelligence.”136 
Linda Greenhouse, who covered the Court for thirty years for the New 
York Times, said McGurn sometimes did more than deflect – he plainly re-
fused to answer questions, and for no apparent reason.137  In the late 1970s, 
early 1980s, she was standing in the PIO’s outer office when the phone 
rang.138  On the other end was a person asking about the status of a case.139  
McGurn said that was a question for the clerk’s office, so the caller asked for 
the phone number, only to be told it was a non-public number.140  “Well, it 
was no such thing; it was a public number,” Greenhouse said.  “You could 
look in the D.C. phonebook, and there it was.  McGurn just had the hard-
wired instinct not to tell anybody anything.”141 
When he did answer a question, McGurn’s information was not always 
reliable.142  For example, he regularly downplayed the seriousness of injuries 
and illnesses that befell the justices, exaggerating the bright side.  Denniston 
said in 1978, “I can’t remember a single illness in the last three years where at 
least one fact was not given in a faulty manner.”143  Of course, it was not 
uncommon for the justices to keep the PIO and others in the dark about their 
injuries and illnesses, but that would better explain an absence of information 
from the PIO, rather than bad information.144 
In general, too, reporters felt they had to be circumspect around McGurn 
because he was to Burger what wiretaps were to Nixon.  For many years, the 
press corps suspected that McGurn was spying on them – eavesdropping on 
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their conversations and relaying what he heard to the chief justice.145  The 
suspicion was so strong that reporters warned newcomers to the beat that 
whatever they said in McGurn’s presence could be passed on.  “You really 
had to be careful,” Carrelli said.  “You could never rely on [McGurn] to keep 
comments that you made, in jest or in passing, to himself.  That strained our 
relationship with him.”146  In fact, the papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
released in 1993, do include memos from McGurn to Burger reporting on 
conversations McGurn overheard among reporters in the press room. 
McGurn worked hard to monitor the press corps and keep the Court’s 
secrets, and at the same time he maintained that the Court was not secretive at 
all.  Rather, he said it operated in a “goldfish bowl.”147  That was the case, 
McGurn said, because the briefs were publicly available, the oral arguments 
were conducted in public, and the justices set out their rulings and reasoning 
in opinions, also publicly available.148  Whether that makes the Court an open 
place is up for debate, but for a while, when reporters retired or otherwise left 
the Court beat, they received goldfish bowls as gifts from their colleagues in 
the press corps.149  And despite McGurn’s best efforts, secrets spilled out of 
the Court on his watch. 
In 1978, it became clear that reporters Bob Woodward and Scott Arm-
strong were working on an investigative project about the Court, beginning 
what McGurn later called “history’s most massive penetration of Supreme 
Court privacy.”150  That project turned out to be The Brethren, published in 
1979, a sprawling behind-the-scenes account of life at the Court.151  Wood-
ward and Armstrong enjoyed unparalleled access, according to the book’s 
introduction: 
Most of the information in this book is based on interviews with more 
than two hundred people, including several Justices, more than 170 
former law clerks, and several dozen former employees of the Court.  
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger declined to assist us in any way . . . .  
We obtained internal memoranda between Justices, letters, notes taken 
at conference, case assignment sheets, diaries, unpublished drafts of 
opinions and, in several instances, drafts that were never circulated 
even to the other Justices.  By the time we had concluded our research, 
we had filled eight file drawers with thousands of pages of documents 
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from the chambers of eleven of the twelve Justices who served during 
the period 1969 to 1976.152 
McGurn chalked up the security and secrecy breach to two things.  One, 
originally Woodward told McGurn and others that the book would focus on 
decision-making in Washington, with the Court as a minor player.  “The talk 
of government rather than specific Supreme Court decision making, plus as-
surances that no one would be asked to betray confidences,” McGurn said, 
“gave the [reporting] team an entrée to many former law clerks.”153  McGurn 
even sent a memo to chambers July 12, 1977, stating that Woodward told 
McGurn the book would not involve “investigative reporting”154 and a second 
memo to chambers July 14, 1977, stating that the “White House will be the 
main focus” of the book.155  Two, McGurn believed that Woodward’s celebri-
ty helped his project.  “Many of the scores of persons approached by Wood-
ward could not resist seeing him,” McGurn said.156  “Thanks to his presiden-
tial exposé, he was himself a personality portrayed glamorously in the movies 
by the ruggedly handsome Robert Redford.”157 
In any case, The Brethren soon sold more than 600,000 copies, earning a 
spot on the New York Times bestseller list.  Hundreds of newspapers ran ex-
cerpts, and the press deluged McGurn for comment, all to no avail.158  He had 
kept the justices aware of the news coverage, but the justices kept their si-
lence.  If nothing else, for McGurn, the book proved that “with sufficient 
resources, energy, nerve and guile, the Supreme Court’s security could be 
breached.”159  But it would not be breached, at least, through the PIO.  A 
former assistant to McGurn, who no longer works at the Court, said Wood-
ward visited the PIO a few times, but “otherwise he didn’t come around 
much, probably because he assumed or realized he wouldn’t get any useful 
information there.”160 
To be sure, that was not the first breach, nor would it be the last.  News 
leaks in most areas of government are regarded as regrettable but inescapable.  
They are a part of doing business in Washington.  But at the Court they are 
regarded as violations of a sacred trust, based partly on the fear that an un-
scrupulous investor could profit at the expense of the innocent if he had ad-
vance knowledge of case outcomes.161  News organizations do not often vio-
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late that trust, so to speak, but it has happened – and it happened when 
McGurn was public information officer.162  In 1973, Time magazine predicted 
the gist of Roe v. Wade, and NPR in 1977 reported that the justices had voted 
5-3 against reviewing the convictions of three defendants in the Watergate 
cover-up case (such votes were supposed to be secret).163 
In another incident, Elizabeth Olson, the Supreme Court reporter for 
United Press International (“UPI”), obtained in June 1981 a document ap-
pearing to indicate in advance the outcome of a case.164  Olson wrote a story 
about the document, but UPI’s Washington Bureau Chief spiked the story 
because he said he “had no way of confirming it was an accurate document,” 
characterizing it as “an eight-page document, unsigned and undated . . . what 
appeared to be a dissent to a majority ruling.”165  He added that the document 
came into Olson’s possession “accidentally” and that it “was attached mistak-
enly to some other material which the Court had distributed to reporters.”166  
McGurn, in a June 17 memo to Burger, said, “Just what the ‘8-page docu-
ment’ may be I do not fathom.”167  Lyle Denniston, then of the Washington 
Star, reported at the time that McGurn had telephoned UPI President Roder-
ick W. Beaton, raising the issue of whether UPI had spiked the story because 
of pressure from the Court.168  It was confirmed that McGurn did make the 
call, but Beaton was out of the office and never talked with McGurn.169  
UPI’s Washington Bureau Chief said he returned the call only after deciding 
to spike Olson’s story.170 
Finally, ABC correspondent Tim O’Brien engineered three leaks in the 
late 1970s.  He reported in advance (generally correctly) the votes or delays 
or outcomes of cases involving media law, prisoner rights, and affirmative 
action.171  McGurn said later that “[j]ustices and reporters alike were aston-
ished.  How was Tim doing it?  What should be done?”172  For its part, the 
press corps was divided.  Some said O’Brien was simply doing as reporters 
do, while others said he was acting irresponsibly.  Morton Mintz, of the 
Washington Post, told McGurn at the time, “Protect your secrets.  We have 
all we can do to study five thousand cases a year and to report on two hun-
dred decisions.  If the leaks keep up, we will have to try to match them.  Our 
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job is already all but impossible and will be twice as difficult.”173  The justic-
es were more upset, and Burger estimated that O’Brien’s enterprises cost him 
“not less than twenty hours on [his] personal schedule.”174  Eventually, after 
Burger reassigned a Government Printing Office linotyper, who worked in 
the Court’s printing unit, the leaks stopped.175  Burger had suspected the lino-
typer was tipping off O’Brien.176 
One of O’Brien’s leaks involved Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke, a 1978 case that took on a life of its own in the press corps and in 
the PIO.177  The legal question was: Did the University of California violate 
the Equal Protection Clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by using an 
affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of a white 
man’s application to attend medical school?178  In other words, Bakke was a 
big case, one that promised to make big headlines and that illustrated to some 
degree the disconnect among the Court, the PIO, and the press. 
Because the Court refused to announce when a particular opinion would 
come down, the press had to stake out the Court day after day, just waiting 
for Bakke.179  For weeks news outlets sent multiple reporters to the Court, for 
weeks NBC and ABC had full camera crews outside, and for weeks editors 
were on standby.180  Those days McGurn began at 9 a.m. to field phone calls 
about Bakke, from people asking if the case had come down.181  He simply 
told each caller to wait until 10:30 a.m., when the Court customarily released 
opinions.182  It appears McGurn did not make the justices aware of the ex-
pense for the press of each day sending multiple reporters, maintaining full 
camera crews, and so forth.183  “He probably didn’t view that as his job,” said 
Carl Stern, formerly of NBC News.184  “Or he figured it wouldn’t have done 
much good.”185  For his part, McGurn simply dismissed the hype, saying that 
every term “there’s a big case, the death penalty cases, the tapes of President 
Nixon.  But we all have to wait.”186 
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At the time, the only other case in recent memory that produced as much 
anticipation was the Nixon tapes case, United States v. Nixon,187 a relative 
bright spot in McGurn’s tenure.188  The president’s fate hanging in the bal-
ance, seemingly every reporter in D.C. wanted a seat at the oral argument.  
William H. Rehnquist, the newest member of the Court and a former assistant 
attorney general in the Nixon administration, recused himself and took no 
part in the case.189  As a result, the job fell to him to decide who got into the 
oral argument – politicians, reporters, and citizens alike.190  Rehnquist, in 
turn, delegated to the PIO the job of deciding which reporters got in, saying 
he would take care of the others.191  McGurn initially suggested that all 300-
some seats should go to the press, on the theory that each reporter served a 
broad audience.192  Rehnquist disagreed and gave McGurn more seats than 
usual, ninety-two in total, but not enough to meet demand.193 
McGurn decided that only one seat would go to each news outlet, a rule 
that did not last long.194  The two American news wires needed two reporters 
each in the room, one for overall coverage and the other for progress reports 
as the argument unfolded.195  Thus, the wires got two seats each.196  McGurn 
then moved through a minefield of other issues, addressing each on the fly: 
Who would get front-row seats?  What is the importance of a news magazine 
compared with a newspaper compared with a TV network?  What about for-
eign correspondents who cover the U.S.?  Reporters from England, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan wanted seats.197  Finally, playing the role of advo-
cate for the press corps, McGurn arranged for the price of oral-argument tran-
scripts to be reduced and for them to be expedited so they would be ready 
thirty minutes after the argument.198 
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All in all, McGurn was as inclusive as possible and received only a few 
complaints out of the hundreds of requests he handled.199  Notably, one of the 
complaints came from a gossip columnist whose paper had a seat in the court-
room.200  It was filled, however, by his paper’s legal correspondent.201  
McGurn understood that the columnist, to get color for his copy, needed to be 
in the courtroom.  So he bent his one-seat-per-outlet rule, admitting the col-
umnist to the argument.202  The next day, the columnist reported that in as-
signing seats McGurn played favorites with those he knew.203 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The story of the PIO’s origins is anchored by the major events of several 
eras – from the Great Depression policymaking of the 1930s to the social and 
political upheaval of the 1970s.  It is also defined by the three men who built 
and shaped the office in the course of forty years.  First, Ned Potter was a 
glorified clerk.  He maintained briefs and opinions for the press, credentialed 
reporters, and supervised the press room.  Court officials emphasized that he 
was not a “press agent” or “public relations counselor.”204  Second, Banning 
Whittington carried on those clerical tasks but also adopted the roles of press 
counselor to the justices and advocate for the press corps.  He sent memos to 
chambers with newspaper clippings, produced an in-house newsletter, and 
proposed changes to Court practices to accommodate the press.205  Third, 
Barrett McGurn was the first to hold the title Public Information Officer, in 
charge of an office larger in physical size and resources than Potter’s and 
Whittington’s.  He was a clerk, counselor and advocate, like Whittington, but 
often it seemed McGurn was there to preserve secrecy and insulate the justic-
es, rather than help the press.  Together, these men – and the events that en-
couraged the Court to institutionalize its relationship with the press – show 
that the story of the PIO’s origins is the story of connecting justices and jour-
nalists, in service of influencing the flow of information related to the Court. 
This is a significant observation and phenomenon because in democratic 
political systems the interaction among elites, institutions, and the public is of 
primary importance.206  Moreover, the flow of information between elites and 
the public is critical to an institution’s functioning and perceived legitima-
cy.207  In an ideal democratic society, citizenship requires people to be aware 
of the activities of government, because a base level of awareness permits 
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them to protect their interests by holding elites and institutions accounta-
ble.208  At the Supreme Court, again, the press is the primary link between the 
justices and the public, and the PIO is the primary link between the justices 
and the press.209  Although much research has focused on news coverage of 
the president and Congress, far less has focused on news coverage of the ju-
diciary, and even less has focused on the PIO and press relations at the Su-
preme Court.210  This Article provides the most complete account to date of 
the PIO’s origins.  However, it is not offered as comprehensive, and it repre-
sents a debt owed to the scholars, such as Richard Davis at Brigham Young 
University, who have devoted their talents to studying news coverage of the 
Supreme Court and the justices’ efforts to manage the institution’s image. 
This area is ripe for more research. 
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